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Boneh etc [1,2] used a so-called Marking Assumption.
It is assumed that the fingerprints can be only modified
at the detective positions by a collusion. A detective
position for C is a position j, 1 ≤ j ≤ v, where
|{a1,j,a2,j, …, ac,j}|>1.
Denote by
D(C)={j: |{a1,j, a2,j, …, ac,j}|>1}⊆{1, 2, …, v}
F(C)={(x1,x2, …, xv): xj=a1,j ∀j ∉ D(C)} ⊆ {0,1,?}v
the symbol ‘?’ indicates a mark on the corresponding
position is erased. The set F(C) consists of all strings
produced by C subject to the Marking Assumption. A
tracing algorithm A outputs a subset of Γ on any input
x ∈ {0,1,?}*. It is expected that the chance of A(x) ⊆
C, for all x ∈F(C), is as high as possible. c-Secure
codes are defined as follows.

Abstract
In this paper, 3- and 4-secure codes are constructed
from combinatorial designs. Both constant weight and
non-constant weight codes are shown.

1. Introduction
Collusion secure fingerprinting codes are introduced
by Boneh and Shaw [1]. A fingerprint is a string over
an alphabet. A fingerprinting code is a collection of
fingerprints and is used to protect the ownership of
digital objects. A fingerprint is embedded into a copy
of the digital object, when the copy is sold, in such a
way that each fingerprint is unique to a copy so that the
distributor of the object is able to identify illegal
redistribution by extracting the fingerprint. The
fingerprint is not known to the buyer so that it is not
easy to tamper with.

Definition 1 ([1,2])
Let ε > 0. A code Γ ⊆ {0,1}v is called c-secure with
tracing error ε if there exists a tracing algorithm A
satisfying condition: if C ⊆ Γ, |C| ≤ c, produces an
x∈{0,1,?}v, then Pr[A(x) ⊆ C]>1- ε.

However, if one has multiple copies of the same object
with different fingerprints, he may compare the copies
and detect where the marks are different and he might
be able to change the mark on the detected positions.
Collusion secure codes are considered as a
fingerprinting code with the following property.
Suppose a pirate copy is found with a fingerprint not
identical to any fingerprint from the fingerprinting
code, at least one of the fingerprints can be traced with
a high probability when the pirate copy was produced
by a certain number of copies. Boneh etc firstly
constructed [1,2] binary c-secure codes with a tracing
error ε.

For binary strings
x=(x1,x2, …, xv), y=(y1,y2, …, yv),
denote
w(x)=x1+x2+ … +xv
µ(x, y)=x1y1+x2y2+ … +xvyv.
If x=(x1,x2, …, xv), y=(y1,y2, …, yv)∈{0,1,?}v, we
define w(x) and µ(x, y) as above by treating symbol ‘?’
as 0. Let Γ be a binary code, denote
µ = maxu,v ∈Γ µ(u, v).
Define a function T: {0,1,?}v→ 2Γ as
T(x)={ui ∈Γ: µ(ui, x)=maxu∈Γ µ(u, x)}
Let C={u1, …, uc}⊆ Γand x∈F(C). Suppose
µ(x, u1) ≥ … ≥ µ(x, uc).
Then µ(x,u1) ≥ w(x)/c. For any u∈Γ\C, we have
µ(x, u) ≤ µ(u1,u)+ … + µ(uc, u) ≤ cµ.
It is obtained that T(x) ⊆ C provided that
(1)
w(x)>c2µ
and x ∈F(C).

In this paper we construct c-secure codes from
combinatorial designs for c=3 and c=4.

2. Preliminaries

Let Γ⊆{0,1}v be a binary code and C⊆Γ be a collusion
of size c>1. Suppose
C={u1, u2, …, uc}, ui=(ai,1, ai,2, …, ai,v).
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B1∩B3 ∩B4 \ B2,
B2∩B3∩B4 \ B1,
B1∩B2 \ (B3∪B4), B1∩B3 \ (B2∪B4),
B1∩B4 \ (B2∪B3), B2∩B3 \ (B1∪B4),
B2∩B4 \ (B1∪B3), B3∩B4 \ (B1∪B2),
B1 \ (B2∪B3∪B4), B2 \ (B1∪B3∪B4),
B3 \ (B1∪B2∪B4), B4 \ (B1∪B2∪B3).
From this we have
6|D(C)|
= 3|D(C) | - |B1∩B2 \ (B3∪B4)| - |B1∩B3 \ (B2∪B4)|
- |B1∩B4 \ (B2∪B3)| - |B2∩B3 \ (B1∪B4)|
- |B2∩B4 \ (B1∪B3)| - |B3∩B4 \ (B1∪B2)|
+ δ(B1∩B2) + δ(B1∩B3) + δ(B1∩B4)
+ δ(B2∩B3) + δ(B2∩B4) + δ(B3∩B4)
Note that for any sets R, S, T, the following holds
|R \ (S∪T)| = |R| - |R∩S| - |R∩T| + |R∩S∩T|
Then we have
3|D(C)|
=δ(B1∩B2) + δ(B1∩B3) + δ(B1∩B4) + δ(B2∩B3)
+ δ(B2∩B4) + δ(B3∩B4) - µ(B1∩B2) - µ(B1∩B3)
- µ(B1∩B4) - µ(B2∩B3) - µ(B2∩B4) - µ(B3∩B4)
+ 3µ(B1∩B2∩B3) + 3µ(B1∩B2∩B4)
+3µ(B1∩B3∩B4) + 3µ(B2∩B3∩B4)
- 6µ(B1∩B2∩B3∩B4)
≥ 6δ - 6µ
So it is obtained that
|D(C)| ≥ 2δ-2µ
(4)

3. 3-Secure Codes
Consider a block design (X, B) where |X|=v. For Bi, Bj
∈ B, we define
µ(Bi, Bj)=|Bi∩Bj|
δ(Bi, Bj)=|Bi \ Bj |+ |Bj \ Bi |
µ=max Bi,Bj∈B,i≠ j µ(Bi, Bj)
δ=min Bi, Bj∈B,i≠j δ(Bi, Bj)
There is a one-to-one correspondence between a subset
of X and a binary string of length v. We shall use the
same notation for a block and the corresponding binary
string.
Let C={B1, B2, B3} ⊆ B. Then F(C) is written as
follows.
F(C)={P⊆X: B1 ∩B2 ∩B3 ⊆ P⊆B1 ∪B2 ∪B3}.
D(C) is partitioned into the following six subsets
B1∩B2\B3, B1 \ (B2∪B3),
B1∩B3\B2, B2\ (B1 ∪B3),
B2∩B3\B1, B3 \ (B1∪B2).
So we have
3|D(C)|=|D(C)|+δ(B1,B2)+δ(B1,B3)+δ(B2,B3).
That is
|D(C)| ≥ 3δ/2.
(2)
Theorem 1
Let ε>0 be given. If there is a block design (X, B) such
that
(3)
µ < 3ε v
3ε + 18
then there is a 3-secure code with tracing error ε.

Theorem 2
Let ε>0 be given. If there is a block design (X, B)
such that
(5)
µ< ε v
2ε + 8
then there is a 4-secure code with tracing error ε.

Proof Let C={B1, B2, B3}, µ′=|B1∩B2 ∩B3|. Noted that
v=µ+δ, inequality (3) provides
9µ < 3 δε
2
Further from (2) we have
9µ -µ′ < 3 δε ≤ ε |D(C)|
2
Define a tracing algorithm A as
T ( x), w( x) > 9 µ
A( x) = 
 Φ,

Proof Let C={B1, B2, B3, B4}, µ′′=|B1∩B2∩B3∩B4|.
Noted that v=µ+δ, inequality (5) provides
16µ < ε(2δ-2µ)
Further from (4) we have
16µ - µ′′ < ε(2δ-2µ) ≤ ε |D(C)|
Define a tracing algorithm A as
T ( x), w( x) > 16 µ
A( x) = 
otherwise
 Φ,
For x∈F(C), it must be w(x) ≥µ′′. Considering (1) we
obtain that

otherwise

For x∈F(C), we have w(x)≥µ'. Considering (1) we
obtain that

16 µ

9µ

Pr[ A( x) = Φ ] =

 | D(C ) | 

w 
w= µ '

∑ 

| D ( C )|

2

Pr[ A( x) = Φ ] =

<ε

 | D(C ) | 

w 
w= µ ''

∑ 

|D ( C )|

2

The theorem is proved.

The theorem is proved.

4. 4-Secure Codes

5. Existence

<ε

We shall show families of block designs with
parameters satisfying (3) in section 5.1 and with
parameters satisfying (5) in section 5.2.

Let (X,B) be a block design and C={B1, B2, B3, B4} ⊆
B. Then
F(C)={P⊆X: B1∩ B2∩B3∩B4⊆P⊆ B1∪B2∪B3∪B4}
and D(C) is partitioned into the following 14 subsets.
B1∩B2∩B4 \ B3,
B1∩B2 ∩B3 \ B4,

5.1 Families of 3-secure codes

550

Wang, Seberry, Wysocki, Wysocki, Susilo, Xia, Zhao & Tran in
Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on the Internet, Telecommunications and Signal Processing (2003)

v+u-1 > 3ε + 18
3ε
for a given ε>0. Hence a 3-secure code with a constant
weight k+1 is obtained.

We firstly show the existing group divisible designs
whose parameters satisfy (3) and hence that define 3secure codes with constant weight. We secondly show
the existing pairwise balanced designs whose
parameters satisfy (3) and that define 3-secure codes
with non-constant weight.

Definition 3 ([3])
A pairwise balanced design PBD(K,λ;v) is a pair
(X, B) where X is a set of v points and B is a collection
of subsets (blocks) of X which satisfies the following
two properties:
1. If B ∈ B, then |B| ∈ K.
2. Every pair of distinct points of X occurs in
exactly λ blocks of B.

Definition 2([3])
Let K and G be sets of positive integers and let λ be a
positive integer. A group divisible design of index λ
and order v, denoted by (K,λ)-GDD, is a triple
(X, G, B), where X is a finite set of cardinality v, G is
a partition of X into parts (groups) whose sizes lie in
G, and B is a family of subsets (blocks) of X which
satisfy the properties:
1. If B∈B, then |B|∈K.
2. Every pair of distinct elements of X occurs in
exactly λ blocks or one group, but not both.
3. |G|>1.

When λ=1, the PBD(K,λ;v) is a PBD(v,K). Suppose
k∈K. We say a PBD(v,K) has a mandatory block of
size k if it contains a block of size k, and we denote
this design by PBD(v,K∪{k*}).
Similar to corollary 1 the following corollary is
straightforward.

If v=a1g1+a2g2+ … +asgs, and if there are ai groups of
size gi, i=1,2, …, s, then the (K,λ)-GDD is of type

g

a1
1

g

a
2

2

L

g

a

Corollary 2
Let ε>0. A PBD(K,1;v) defines a 3-secure code with
error ε provided that

s

s

If K={k}, then the (K,λ)-GDD is a (k, λ)-GDD. If λ=1,
then the (K,λ)-GDD is a K-GDD. Furthermore, a (k,1)GDD is a k-GDD.

v>

Corollary 1
Let ε>0. A K-GDD defines a 3-secure code with error
ε provided that
v > 3ε + 18
3ε
Proof It is straightforward from theorem 1 by noting
that µ=1 in a K-GDD.

3ε + 18
3ε

Theorem 5 ([3])
Let N≥3={n∈Z: n≥3}. Then a PBD(v,N≥3∪{k*}) exists
if and only if v≥2k+1 except when
1. v=2k+1 and k=0 (mod 2);
2. v=2k+2 and k≠4 (mod 6), k>1;
3. v=2k+3 and k=0 (mod 2), k>6;
4. (v,k)∈{(7,2), (8,2), (9,2),(10,2), (11,4), (12,2),
(13,2), (17,6)}.

Theorem 3 ([3])
For any prime power q, there exists a (q+1)-GDD of
type (q2-q)q+1(q2)1.

For any given ε>0, there is a v>(3ε+18)/3ε such that a
PBD(v, N≥3∪{k*}) exists. From this design, a 3-secure
code is obtained. The code has variety weights, one of
the weights is k≤(v-1)/2.

If (X, B) is a (q+1)-GDD of type (q2-q)q+1(q2)1, the
cardinality of X is
v=(q+ 1)(q2-q)+ q2=q3+q2-q
For any given ε>0, a prime power q satisfying
q3+q2-q > 3ε + 18
3ε
exists and so does a 3-secure code with tracing error ε.
The code has a constant weight q+1.

Theorem 6 ([3])
Let Nodd denote the set of all odd positive integers. Let
v and k be odd positive integers that satisfy v≥2k+1.
Then there exists a PBD(v, Nodd ∪{k*}).
Similarly, a 3-secure code with variety weights is
obtained from PBD(v, Nodd∪{k*}).

Theorem 4 ([3])
Suppose that there exists a resolvable BIBD(v,k,1),
which contains u mutually disjoint parallel classes. Let
n=v/k. Then there exists a (k+1)-GDD of type kn(u-1)1.

5.2 Families of 4-secure codes
We show families of block designs whose parameters
satisfy (5) in terms of group divisible designs and
pairwise balanced designs. These designs give 4-secure
codes with constant and non-constant weight,
respectively.

If (X, B) is a (k+1)-GDD of type kn(u-1)1, the
cardinality of X is
nk+(u-1)=v+u-1
which can be chosen such that
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dual binary Hamming code, Electronics Letters,
Vol. 36, No. 20, pp. 1697-1699, 2000.

Corollary 3
Let ε>0. A K-GDD defines a 4-secure code with
tracing error ε provided that
v > 2ε + 8
ε
Let ε>0 be given, q be a prime power satisfying
(q+1)(q2-q)+q2 > 2ε + 8
ε
then the (q+1)-GDD of type (q2-q)q+1(q2)1 defines a 4secure code with tracing error ε. The code has a
constant weight q+1.
In the (k+1)-GDD of type kn(u-1)1, the cardinality of X
is chosen such that
v+u-1 > 2ε + 8
ε
for a given ε>0. Then a 4-secure code with a constant
weight k+1 is obtained.
Corollary 4
Let ε>0. A PBD(K,1;v) defines a 4-secure code with
tracing error ε provided that
v > 2ε + 8
ε
For any given ε>0, there is a v>(2ε+8)/ε such that a
PBD(v, N≥3∪{k*}) exists. From this design, a 4-secure
code is obtained. The code has variety weights, one of
the weights is k≤(v-1)/2.
Similarly, a 4-secure code with variety weights is
obtained from PBD(v, Nodd ∪{k*}).

6. Conclusion
Since the first construction [1,2] of collusion secure
codes given by Boneh etc., there have been a few
constructions of 2-, 3-secure codes in [4,5,6]. We
constructed families of 3- and 4-secure codes from
combinatorial designs in this paper. The tracing
algorithm is simple.
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